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Abstract 
The Japanese government introduced new foreign aid guidelines in 1991 and it pledged 
to impose aid sanctions on those aid recipient countries whose governments violated 
human rights or democratic principles. The introduction of the new aid guidelines is 
expected to produce a certain effect on Japan’s foreign aid policy. This paper examines 
Japan’s aid sanctions policy toward Latin American countries as a case study. Since 
new ODA guidelines were introduced, Japan implemented three positive reinforcements 
in Latin America, i.e. in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Peru, while negative 
reinforcements were introduced twice, i.e. in Haiti and Guatemala. The findings 
indicate that Japan apparently pledges to promote human rights and democracy with 
the aim of showing solidarity with other aid donor countries while the pursuit of 
economic interests seem to remain a driving force behind Japanese aid policy.  
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1. Introduction 
The Japanese government introduced new foreign aid policy guidelines in 1991 and it 
pledged to impose aid sanctions on those aid recipient countries whose governments 
violated human rights or democratic principles.1 According to a Japan’s high ranking 
officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), under the new aid guideline, “the 
government said it would pay full attentions to……efforts toward democratization, 
respect for human rights and freedom” (Kawakami, 1993). 
 
Before the introduction of the new aid policy guidelines, Japan seldom showed an 
interest in the political conditions in aid recipients (Orr, 1993a). The introduction of the 
new aid guidelines is expected to produce a certain effect on Japan’s foreign aid policy. 
However, Japan has been repeatedly criticised for taking lenient measures toward aid 
recipients in Asia (see Arase, 1993 and Okuizumi, 1995).  
 
It is very important to note that the Japanese government uses its aid power to influence 
aid recipients not only by employing “negative reinforcement” (shokyoku-teki kanren in 
Japanese) but also through the use of the “positive reinforcement (sekkyoku-teki kanren 
in Japanese)”. In other words, the Japanese government can choose to impose negative 
reinforcement (the suspension or a decrease in foreign aid) on recipient countries where 
undesirable policy changes occur, while positive reinforcement (an increase in foreign 
aid) would be applied to aid recipients that conduct desirable polices in the light of 
Japan’s foreign aid guidelines (Furuoka, 2006). 
 
This paper examines Japan’s aid policy toward Latin American countries. Since new 
                                                 
1 There is a “policy shift” in the Japan’s foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. For detailed 
discussion, see Furuoka (2002). 
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ODA guidelines were introduced, Japan implemented three “positive reinforcements” in 
Latin America, i.e. in Nicaragua (1991), El Salvador (1991) and Peru (1992), while 
“negative reinforcements” were introduced twice, i.e. in Haiti (1991) and Guatemala 
(1993) (Furuoka 2005). 
 
 
2. Positive and Negative Reinforcements    
To understand Japan’s aid sanctions policy, the Japanese way of imposing aid sanctions 
needs to be taken into account. The Japanese government justifies its dealings with 
repressive regimes by stressing the importance of the “persuasive approach” practiced 
by Japan. According to Japan’s ODA 1994, “The policy dialogue pursued by Japan is 
unique in that Japan does not apply its standards automatically to the planning of 
development projects... This stance putting emphasis on policy dialogue is reflected in 
the ODA Charter” (MOFA, 1994: 53). 
 
In a similar vein, Japan’s ODA 1995 states that when problems contravening the 
principles of the ODA Charter occur, it is important to listen to explanations of recipient 
countries and hold dialogues with them. The document thus describes Tokyo’s methods, 
“The Japanese approach is to work tenaciously on the recipient countries toward 
achieving the goal through friendly persuasion and quiet and patient diplomacy” 
(MOFA, 1995: 47). 
 
The Japanese government admits that it prefers to use positive reinforcement. 
According to Japan’s ODA 1995, Tokyo adopts positive reinforcement with the aim of 
encouraging recipient countries that show signs of improvement in such areas as 
democratisation, human rights and restraints in military expenditure. By contrast, Japan 
employs negative reinforcement when political situations in recipient countries are 
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viewed as undesirable in the light of Japan’s ODA Charter (MOFA, 1995: 48). 
 
From the Japanese government’s perspective, positive reinforcement is more practical 
and effective than negative reinforcement. The Japanese government explains its 
preference for the use of positive reinforcement by stating that negative reinforcement 
can backfire and thus retard the movement toward improvement. Besides, the use of 
negative reinforcement may create an impression that Japan is trying to impose her 
values on aid recipients (MOFA, 1995: 48). 
 
Japan’s ODA 1996 mentions that problems that may arise with the implementation of 
negative reinforcement. The document claims that even if the recipient country’s actions 
are repugnant to the principles of Japan’s ODA Charter, it is not appropriate for Japan 
to cut off aid immediately because those actions might be dictated by the recipient’s 
security and are domestic matters. As the document explains, “Furthermore, there could 
be a case where both desirable and undesirable actions in the view of the ODA Charter 
co-exist in one country at the same time. In this case it would be inappropriate to pay 
attention solely to the negative events and reduce or freeze ODA disbursement” 
(MOFA, 1996: 38-39). 
 
Japan’s ODA 1996 stresses the importance of recognizing the recipient countries’ 
efforts to improve their political situations and states, “As the aim of the ODA’s 
principles is to help recipient countries put the content of the principles into practice, it 
is necessary to encourage them to embrace the principles as a value worth of pursuit of 
their own accord and urge them to make efforts for its realisation”. The Japanese 
government thus explains why Japan avoids imposing her own values on aid recipients, 
“If Japan takes strict actions to recipient countries... it may be viewed by the latter as a 
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unilateral imposition of values, provoke a backlash, and delay improvements in the 
situation. When there emerges in a recipient country a move repugnant to the spirit or 
the principles (of the ODA Charter), it is important to have bilateral dialogue or to bring 
international influence in collaboration with other countries rather than unilaterally 
tamper with ODA projects” (MOFA, 1996: 38-39).  
 
The question is whether Japan’s preference for positive reinforcement is effective or 
desirable. There are contradicting views on the practice of dealing with repressive 
regimes through positive reinforcement. For example, a leading Japanese economic 
journal praised Japan’s initiative in Myanmar, calling it “Sun diplomacy”. Using an 
analogy of Aesop’s fable about a wager between the north wind and the sun, the article 
compared the US approach (negative reinforcement) to the north wind while Japan’s 
policy (positive reinforcement) was equated with the sun. According to the journal, 
Tokyo’s diplomatic efforts and contacts with the Myanmar military government 
contributed to the release of Aung San Su Kyi (Ekonomisuto, June 18, 1996: 17).  
 
A Japanese ODA specialist, Wataru Hosaka, gives an altogether different analysis of the 
same event. He states that the use of Aesop’s fable was not very successful and could 
neither explain nor justify Japan’s policy toward Myanmar. Hosaka points out that it is 
unacceptable that the Japanese people’s taxes are spent on a repressive regime and 
warns that such policies will render “nominal” the ODA Charter’s principles (Kokusai 
Kaihatsu Janaru, February. 1996: 26-27). 
 
2.1. Positive Reinforcement 
Although the Japanese government has more frequently employed positive 
reinforcement since the ODA Charter’s introduction in 1992, a prototype of this method 
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had existed before the announcement of the new aid guidelines. According to Inada 
(1995: 5), Japan’s active assistance to the new government of the Philippines, after 
President Marcos was ousted in 1986, can be considered the first case of the application 
of positive reinforcement. 
 
Since the introduction of the new aid guidelines, Tokyo applied positive reinforcement 
and provided foreign aid to three Latin American countries, Nicaragua (1991), El 
Salvador (1991) and Peru (1992). These nations had a long history of civil disorder and 
had struggled to establish more democratic political systems. Positive reinforcement 
was also employed in Africa in Madagascar (1991), Zambia (1992) and Guinea (1992).2 
In Asia, positive reinforcement was used in Mongolia (1992), Cambodia (1992), the 
Asian republics of the former Soviet Union (1992), and Vietnam (1993) (see Furuoka, 
2006). 
 
2.2. Negative Reinforcement 
The Japanese government is usually very prudent in applying negative reinforcement 
and resorts to it only if persuasion does not work. According to Orr (1993b: 14), when 
serious human rights abuses take place in a recipient country or there is a serious 
setback in democracy (especially, a military coup d'etat), Tokyo takes the following 
three steps: 1) persuasion, 2) persuasion plus soft measures, 3) aid cuts.  
 
In the initial stage, Japan expresses concern about the situation and warns the recipient 
country of possible punitive measures. Tokyo uses diplomatic channels to persuade a 
recipient to improve the negative situation. If there are no signs of improvement after 
the first warning, the Japanese government issues the second warning. If the negative 
                                                 
2 The detailed descriptions of Japanese aid sanctions policy toward African countries, see Furuoka (2007). 
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situation persists, Japan normally freezes the amount of foreign aid at the previous 
year’s level. Finally, if this measure also fails, the Japanese government reduces or 
suspends foreign aid to the country. 
 
Since the introduction of the new guidelines in 1991, Tokyo has reviewed foreign aid to 
nine African countries, i.e. Kenya (1991), Zaire (1991), Malawi (1992), Sudan (1992), 
Sierra Leone (1992), Togo (1993), Zambia (1993), Nigeria (1994), and the Gambia 
(1994) (see Furuoka, 2007). In Latin America, Japan used negative reinforcement in 
Haiti (1991) and Guatemala (1993). It is worth noting that, in the 1980s before the ODA 
Charter was promulgated, Japan had taken similar measures towards two Asian 
countries, i.e. Burma (1988) and China (1989) (Furuoka, 2006).  
 
2.3. Driving Force behind Japanese Aid Sanctions Policy   
The real driving force behind Japan’s aid policy is said to be the promotion of Japan’s 
economic interests. This hypothesis assumes that the Japanese government would take 
into account economic relations between Japan and the recipient country when 
deliberating the introduction of aid sanctions against the recipient. In other words, there 
is a difference in the application of Japanese aid sanctions to those countries that Japan 
has strong economic relations with to those countries that have weaker ties with Japan. 
Therefore, before further discussing Japanese aid sanctions episodes in Latin America, 
this section will briefly analyse Japan’s economic relations with her aid recipients. 
 
Among recipients of Japan’s ODA, Asian countries have very strong economic ties with 
Japan. In terms of international trade, Asia has been an important destination for 
Japanese exports (see Table 1). The region received US$83 billion of Japanese exports 
in 1989, US$90 billion in 1991, and US$193 billion in 1995. Due to a rapid increase of 
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Japanese exports to China, the importance of Asia as Japan’s trade partner was further 
enhanced in the 1990s. In 1997, Japanese exports to Asia amounted to US$177 billion, 
and increased to US$277 billion in 2004.  
 
Table 1   Japanese Exports to Developing Countries by Area (million US$) 
 1989 1991 1995 1997 2004 
Asia 82,626 90,146 193,411 177,534 273,708 
Latin 
America 
8,793 12,221 18,610 19,839 21,649 
Africa 4,439 4,960 6,331 4,196 7,657 
 
Source: data on Japanese exports in 1989 and 1991 are from IMF (1996: 267-269) 
             data on Japanese exports in 1995 and 1997 are from IMF (1998: 271-273) 
  data on Japanese Export in 2004 is from JETRO (2007a) 
 
Latin America and Africa were Japan’s minor trade partners (see Table 1). In 1989, 
Japanese exports to Latin America amounted to more then US$8 billion. They gradually 
increased to US$12 billion in 1991, and further increased to US$19 billion in 1997. In 
2004, Japanese exports to Latin America exceeded US$ 21 billion. To compare, 
Japanese exports to Africa accounted for less than US$10 billion from 1989 to 2003.  
 
To sum up, Japan has stronger economic relations with Asian countries than with Latin 
American or African countries. If the promotion of own economic interest is real 
driving force behind Japan’s aid sanctions policy, Japan would take strict aid sanctions 
against non-Asian countries, such as Latin American countries.  
  
3. Japanese Aid Sanctions in Latin America 
This section will examine Japan’s aid policy toward Latin American countries. Since 
new ODA guidelines were introduced, Japan implemented three positive reinforcements 
in Latin America, i.e. in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Peru, while negative 
reinforcements were introduced twice, i.e. in Haiti and Guatemala. On the other hand, 
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Japan did not implement negative reinforcement in Peru (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2 
Positive Reinforcement and Negative Reinforcement in Latin America  
 
Country Year Measures Human 
Rights 
Condition 
Index3
Area 
Positive 
Reinforcement 
    
1. Nicaragua 1991 To assist in national 
reconstruction efforts 
Three (1991) Latin America
2. El Salvador 1991 To assist in national 
reconstruction efforts 
Three (1991) Latin America
3. Peru 1992 To assist elections for 
Constitutional Assembly   
Six (1992) Latin America
Negative 
Reinforcement 
    
1. Haiti 1991 Aid suspension 
(Aid resumed in 1994) 
Seven (1991) 
Five (1994) 
Latin America
2. Peru  
    
1991 No aid suspension Three (1991) 
Six (1992) 
Latin America
3. Guatemala 1993 Aid suspension Four (1993) Latin America
 
Source: Furuoka (2005) 
 
3.1. Positive Reinforcement in Latin America 
a) Nicaragua 
In 1990, a prolonged civil war in Nicaragua finally ended and a general election was 
held. The coalition party of the anti-military government (the anti-Sandinistas 
government) won the election and, in April 1990, the military government peacefully 
transferred power to the elected government. The leader of the coalition party, Violeta 
Barrios de Chamorro, became the country’s new president. She was able to overcome 
political instability caused by the strikes that a union affiliated with the Sandinistas had 
provoked. The new president achieved substantial success in bringing about peace 
                                                 
3 Freedom House Index of political rights is used to measure the human rights condition in recipient 
countries. The index uses a one-to-seven scale and assigns higher numbers to countries with worse human 
rights conditions. 
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domestically by reducing the military force from 80,000 to 20,000 persons and 
disarming the Contra guerrilla groups that stood against the Sandinistas. 
 
To support these positive changes, Tokyo decided to provide additional foreign aid to 
Nicaragua. According to Japan’s ODA 1992, “Japan provided Nicaragua, which saw a 
peaceful transition from the Sandinista to the Chamorro administration in April 1990, 
with ¥2.55 billion (US$17.0 million) in bilateral aid in FY 1990, and the equivalent of 
US$70 million in structural adjustment loans and ¥2.085 billion (US$15.4 million) in 
grant aid in FY 1991, to assist in national reconstruction efforts” (MOFA, 1993a: 28).  
 
Since then, Japan has continued to support Nicaragua. Japan’s ODA to the country 
increased from US$1 million in 1990 to US$48 million in 1991, and reached US$54 
million in 1992. In 1995, Japan allocated to Nicaragua US$51 million of foreign aid and 
was the country’s second biggest aid donor (MOFA, 1997: 226-227). 
  
b) El Salvador 
In El Salvador, positive political changes took place in 1992 after President Cristiani 
Alfredo succeeded in his efforts to put an end to civil war. In January 1992, under the 
supervision of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), the El 
Salvadorian government and the rebel force, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation 
Front (FMLN), signed a peace agreement that put an end to 12 years of civil war. Soon 
after, other positive changes took place in El Salvador, among them the demobilisation 
of the FMLN and their return to civilian life, reforms in the Armed Forces, politics, 
judiciary and the economy, and the establishment of the National Civil Police. 
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Japan together with other countries assisted the national reconstruction of El Salvador. 
As Japan’s ODA 1992 stated, “To assist in the country’s national reconstruction, Japan 
announced the extension of an emergency assistance package to El Salvador comprised 
of, for example, ¥500 million (US$4.23 million) in non-project grant aid, in cooperation 
and coordination with international community” (MOFA, 1992a: 28). Japan’s ODA to 
El Salvador increased two-fold from US$7 million in 1991 to US$14 million in 1992. It 
amounted to US$21 million in 1993, and reached US$48 million in 1994 (MOFA, 1997: 
376). 
 
c) Peru 
In Peru, President Alberto Fujimori was inaugurated in July 1990. The new president 
inherited a bankrupt economy and became vigorously engaged in reforming the 
country’s economic structure. In December 1991, in support of Fujimori’s 
administration reform efforts, Japan gave to Peru bilateral loans totalling US$400 
million. In addition, Tokyo decided to extend grant aid of ¥3.5 billion (US$26.2 
million), and provided a bilateral loan totalling US$100 million in co-financing with the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (MOFA, 1992b: 298-299).   
 
In April 1992, Fujimori temporary suspended the constitution and dissolved Parliament. 
Late in 1992, he announced an intention to hold a national election for a constitutional 
assembly and proposed to hold a national referendum on the draft of the new 
constitution. The election for the constitutional assembly was held on November 22, 
1992 under the supervision of an Organisation of American States’ (OAS) observation 
team (MOFA, 1993a: 37).  
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To facilitate the electoral process, the Japanese government provided grants to Peru. 
According to Japan’s ODA 1993, “With a view to cooperating in the election of 
constitutional assembly of Peru, Japan has extended technical cooperation by receiving 
trainees for instructing on election data management and by supplying computers worth 
about ¥73.5 million (US$565 thousand) for processing election data” (MOFA, 1993a: 
37). 
 
3.2. Negative Reinforcement in Latin America 
a) Haiti 
In Haiti, democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted and exiled 
after a military coup d’etat led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras in September 1991. 
Despite international diplomatic efforts to restore democracy, the political situation in 
Haiti had not shown any signs of improvement. However, in September 1994, after the 
UN adopted a resolution on military intervention in Haiti the Cedras regime softened its 
stance and promised to allow Aristide to return to the country. In October 1994, 
President Aristide returned to Haiti under the supervision of the US government 
(MOFA, 1995: 12-15). 
 
Tokyo suspended foreign aid to Haiti after the coup d’etat. Japan’s ODA 1997 gives the 
following explanation for the aid cut, “In September 1991, a military coup d’etat 
occurred in Haiti... Japan immediately froze assistance to Haiti, based on the four ODA 
guidelines” (MOFA, 1997: 72). This was one of the earliest episodes when Japan 
applied the new ODA principles to the issues of political conditions in recipient 
countries.  
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This fact did not go unnoticed. A major Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shinbun, 
commented in 1992, “Although Prime Minister Kaifu announced the “Four Principles 
of ODA” in 1991, there had been no examples of its application, except in the case of 
Haiti where a military coup d’etat took place in September 1991” (Asahi Shinbun, May 
15, 1992). In a similar vein, Murai notes that though since 1991, there have been many 
instances when Japan should have had imposed aid sanctions, the Japanese government 
took measures only toward Haiti (Japan-Asia Quarterly Review, January, 1993: 44).      
  
In February 1993, Tokyo extended to Haiti small-scale bilateral grants worth about ¥5.2 
million (US$44 thousand) from humanitarian considerations.4 The Japanese 
government stressed that the aid was given as humanitarian assistance and did not mean 
that Japan was prepared to lift negative reinforcement. Japan’s ODA 1993 explained 
that due to economic isolation, the Haitian people suffered from impoverishment and 
this prompted some international organisations to appeal for humanitarian aid to Haiti. 
“Japan’s aid is given from humanitarian standpoint in response to these appeals but it 
does not signal a change in our policy of freezing economic aid to the junta-led 
government of that country” (MOFA, 1993a: 40-41).  
 
In 1991, before the military coup d’etat, Japan provided to Haiti bilateral grants 
amounting to ¥1,093 million (US$8.09 million). After the coup the aid was halted in 
1992 and remained at a marginal level of ¥18 million (US$152 thousand). In 1994, 
Tokyo lifted negative reinforcement, and Haiti received ¥1,141 million (US$10.6 
million) in grants from Japan. In 1995, the amount of grants increased by 40 percent and 
totalled ¥1,586 million (US$17 million) (MOFA, 1995: 72). 
                                                 
4 Aristide’s return to Haiti was considered by Japan a positive development and significant step toward 
the normalisation of the political situation. The Japanese government announced it would support 
Aristide’s efforts to restore democracy and lifted the freeze on official development assistance. 
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b) Guatemala 
In Guatemala, President Jorge Serrano Elias made serious efforts to improve the 
country’s economic situation. However, the economic stimulation measures introduced 
by the government failed to improve people’s lives. As a result, disorder spread 
throughout the country, the political situation became chaotic, the ruling coalition party 
collapsed and Serrano’s political power was considerably weakened.5 To overcome 
political chaos, in May 1993 Serrano partially suspended the country’s constitution, 
dissolved parliament and the Supreme Court (MOFA, 1993b: 53-54).  
 
The Japanese government considered that these measures went against democratic 
principles and expressed its concern to the Guatemalan government. Despite pressure 
from Japan and other donor countries, there were no signs of improvement. In June 
1993, Japan suspended aid to Guatemala as a result of continuous demands for restoring 
democracy from inside and outside the country.6  
 
Japan acted in accord with other aid donors when she suspended foreign aid to 
Guatemala. According to Japan’s ODA 1996, the decision of President Serrano to 
partially suspend the nation’s constitution “was not well received by the international 
community and led Japan to re-examine its aid policy to Guatemala. Japan decided that, 
with the exception of aid of an emergency or humanitarian nature, new project 
applications would not be received and that project requests already under consideration 
would be frozen” (MOFA, 1996: 103-104). 
 
                                                 
5 Political chaos continued until 1996, when a peace accord between the government and guerrilla forces 
was finally signed.   
6 Serrano lost power and fled the country on July 2, 1993. A new president was elected through 
democratic elections. The Japanese government welcomed the positive developments and resumed aid to 
Guatemala on June 11, 1993. 
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c) Peru 
In Peru, Japan chose an independent course of action. When President Fujimori 
abolished Parliament and the country’s constitution, many donor countries immediately 
suspended their foreign aid to Peru. The Economist described Fujimori’s regime as a 
dictatorship, “He (Fujimori) seems to have been remarkably naive about how this 
dictatorship would be seen abroad”. According to the journal, Fujimori realised that the 
government was going to run out of money due to the US and Germany’s aid 
suspension. As the journal reported, “The Americans have been putting pressure on 
Japan to do so” (The Economist, May 23, 1992: 44). The Japanese government, 
however, decided not to impose negative reinforcement on Peru despite very strong 
foreign pressures. 
  
The Japanese government insisted, “The situation in Peru did not deteriorate to an 
extent that would have required the suspension of aid” (The Economist, May 23, 1992: 
44). Instead of negative reinforcement, Japan used a demarche to influence the Peruvian 
president to improve the political situation in the country. Japan also called for an early 
restoration of the democratic system. Japan’s ODA 1992 asserts that the Japanese 
government’s policies in Peru were effective. “The Peruvian government, partially due 
to persuasion from Japan, outlined a process for restoration of democratic institutions” 
(MOFA, 1992a: 30).  
 
4. Evaluation of Japanese Aid Sanctions Policy toward Latin American Countries 
Japan’s use of positive reinforcement in Nicaragua and El Salvador caused no 
controversy. The Japanese government’s policy in Peru, however, raised many 
objections. Tokyo began paying attention to Peru after Fujimori’s inauguration as the 
Peruvian president in 1990. The ethnic Japanese origin of the new Peruvian president 
 
 
15
was one reason for the Japanese government’s support of his policies.7 Japan began to 
treat Peru as a “special country” in Latin America and considered it a “pro-Japan 
nation”. As The Economists noted in 1992, “Mr. Fujimori seems to have tried to win 
friends abroad -- notably in Japan” (The Economist, April 11, 1992: 41).    
 
Tokyo disbursed large amounts of foreign aid to Peru. In 1991 and 1992, Japan was 
Peru’s top aid donor with US$352 million and US$154 million of foreign aid, 
respectively. In 1993, when other donors resumed assistance to Peru, Japan provided 
that country with US$130 million of ODA and remained its second biggest aid donor 
(MOFA, 1993a: 439-441). 
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Figure 1   Negative Reinforcement in Latin America 
                                                 
7 Fujimori claimed that he was not sure whether he was a Japanese national.  However, after he sought 
political asylum in Japan in 2000, the Japanese government confirmed that he still held Japanese 
citizenship. Fujimori announced that he would exercise his Japanese nationality to escape persecution by 
political opponents at home (The Star, December 13, 2000).  
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Peru has been the biggest recipient of Japan’s ODA in Latin America. For comparison, 
in 1991, Tokyo provided US$17.8 million of foreign aid to Chile, US$27.1 million to 
Argentine, US$39.4 million to Brazil, and US$45.1 million to Mexico. In 1992, Japan’s 
aid to Chile, Argentine, Brazil and Mexico accounted for US$18.3 million, US$23.7 
million, US$63.4 million, and US$60.3 million, respectively (MOFA, 1991: 339-371).          
  
The Japanese government’s explanation that after Fujimori suspended Parliament, the 
political situation in Peru was not grave and did not demand extraordinary measures, 
failed to provide a good reason for Japan’s lenient attitude. Kaoru Okuizumi points out 
that Japan acted differently in a similar situation in Guatemala where, after President 
Serrano suspended Parliament in 1993, the Japanese government imposed negative 
reinforcement. Okuizumi asserts that such inconsistency in policy was due to the fact 
that Japan had much bigger economic interests in Peru than in Guatemala. As he 
commented, “Peru, although traditionally not a big recipient of Japanese aid, recently 
has attracted the interest of the Japanese business community because of Fujimori’s 
Japanese ancestry” (Okuizumi, 1995: 393-394).      
 
Soderberg (1996: 143) agrees that Tokyo was not worried about hurting its interests in 
Guatemala, because diplomatic relations between the two countries were very weak and 
trade relations were negligible. Haiti is another Latin American country that has weak 
diplomatic and economic ties with Japan. Franklin Lavin (1996: 144) noted this fact 
when he wrote, “Countries will agree to subscribe to the proposed economic sanctions 
only when the costs are so low as to make their participation (in sanctions) essentially 
symbolic, such as Japan’s support for the US policy to Haiti”.  
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To sum up the above, the Japanese government does not hesitate to impose negative 
reinforcement on Latin American countries if it has no vested interests in those 
countries. By contrast, if negative reinforcement were likely to hurt Japan’s economic 
interests or spoil diplomatic relations with a country, as could happen in Peru, Japan 
would adopt lenient measures (see Figure 1). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The Japanese government prefers to use the method of positive reinforcement rather 
than negative reinforcement, claiming the former to be more effective in reaching policy 
goals. Policymakers in Tokyo maintain that negative reinforcement can backfire and 
retard democratic movements in aid recipients.  
 
Putting aside official explanations, the facts show that Japan took strict measures when 
human rights abuses occur in Haiti or Guatemala. By contrast, Japan avoided taking 
stern actions against Peru. In other word, the Japanese government did not take punitive 
measures against Peru when grave human rights violations happened, because 
suspending aid could seriously hurt Japan’s economic interests.  
  
When the new aid guidelines were adopted in 1991, the Japanese government promised 
to rigorously apply those to promote human rights or democratization in the developing 
countries. In practice, the principles were often sacrificed for the sake of economic 
interests. The findings indicate that Japan apparently pledges to promote human rights 
and democracy with the aim of showing solidarity with other aid donor countries while 
the pursuit of economic interests seem to remain a driving force behind Japanese aid 
policy.  
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As a conclusion, the Japanese government refrained from taking strict measures against 
country that maintain strong economic and diplomatic relations with Japan. This seems 
to indicate that policymakers in Tokyo still give priority to Japan’s economic interests.  
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